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The Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) Presidential Task Force on Publication 
and Research Practices was appointed in response to concerns about the dependability and 
replicability of research findings in personality and social psychology, a problem that also 
plagues fields as diverse as physics, economics, biochemistry, medicine and cell biology.  In this 
article the Task Force offers a brief statistical primer and recommendations for improving the 
dependability of scientific research.  Recommendations for research practice include (1) 
describing and addressing the choice of N (sample size) and consequent issues of statistical 
power, (2) reporting effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for findings, (3) avoiding 
“questionable research practices” that can undermine the assumptions underlying statistical 
procedures and inflate the probability of Type I error, (4) making available research materials 
necessary to replicate reported results, (5) adhering to SPSP’s data sharing policy, (6) 
encouraging publication of high quality replication studies, and (7), maintaining flexibility and 
openness to alternative standards and methods when evaluating research.  Recommendations 
for educational practice include (1) encouraging a culture of “getting it right” rather than 
“finding significant results,” (2) teaching and encouraging transparency of data reporting, (3) 
improving methodological instruction on topics such as effect size, confidence intervals, 
statistical power, replication, and the effects of questionable research practices, and (4) 
modeling sound science and supporting junior researchers who seek to “get it right.” The hope 
is that these recommendations can help lead the way to improved research practices and a 
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Improving the Dependability of Research in Personality and Social Psychology: 
Recommendations for Research and Educational Practice 
The SPSP Presidential Task Force on Publication and Research Practices was appointed in 
February 2013 and charged with making recommendations to the Executive Committee 
concerning actions to improve the dependability and replicability of research findings in 
personality and social psychology.  The impetus for this task force arose in response to growing 
concerns about the dependability and replicability of research findings in fields as diverse as 
physics, economics, biochemistry, medicine, and cell biology, as well as in psychology.  As a 
behavioral science organization, SPSP is well positioned to be a leader in improving research 
practices and professional communication across disciplines.  The hope is that the actions taken 
by SPSP will be a model for other organizations within and outside of psychology. 
The current wave of concern about the dependability of research findings arguably started with 
Ioannidis’s (2005) provocatively titled paper, “Why most published research findings are false.” 
The paper raised issues that apply to much of science, arguing that incentive structures and 
research practices produce a high rate of false positive findings.  In psychology, the paper's 
shockwaves were amplified by a series of events including the publication of Vul et al.’s (2009) 
critique of social and affective neuroscience, followed by reactions – ranging from incredulous 
to disdainful – to Bem’s (2011) article on extrasensory perception.  Shortly thereafter, a number 
of prominent symposia and articles criticized research practices in psychology said to be 
widespread (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012). 
Around the same time, and presumably coincidentally, three well-known social/personality 
psychologists each retracted multiple papers, and in one case admitted to falsifying results, 
while other cases of data fraud emerged in fields including biology, oncology, genetics and even 
dentistry.  
It is important to note that the research practices questioned by Vul, Simmons, John and others 
(and illuminated in the specific case of the Bem article) have nothing to do with data fraud.  The 
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practices that have become almost traditional -- and did not question the basic integrity of 
anyone's data.  However, the contemporaneous emergence of cases of data fraud drew added 
attention to already-regnant concerns about the dependability of published research findings.  
Critiques of psychology’s research methods and practices are far from new (e.g., Carver, 1978; 
Cohen, 1994; Meehl, 1967).  However, the conflation of recent events has led to calls for 
reform that are unprecedented in breadth and intensity.  And, by and large, the field of 
psychology is responding (perhaps more so than many other scientific disciplines; Yong, 2012). 
The Association for Psychological Science announced several major initiatives aimed at 
improving the dependability of research published in their journals, the Psychonomic Society 
revamped publication guidelines, and other journals, organizations, and even government 
agencies are in the midst of similar examinations. Things are changing, and as the largest 
organization for social/personality researchers in the world, SPSP is in a unique position and has 
a special obligation to take a leading role in shaping these changes. 
In April 2013, the SPSP task force met to generate recommendations for steps to improve the 
quality of research practices and the dependability of research findings. The purpose of this 
article is to outline these recommendations and some of the basic principles and statistical 
issues that lie behind them.1 Although the need for the task force arose due to the events of 
the past few years, our recommendations are forward-looking. Their broad goal is to improve 
the quality of research, so that psychology can do an even better job in pursuing its core 
mission of understanding human beings as the complex social creatures they are.   
How can "research quality" be defined?  Many suggestions focus on replicability. Although 
replication may be the ultimate test of a scientific hypothesis or theory, it is not the only 
indicator of "truth-value," and many worthwhile studies are difficult or impossible to replicate 
(e.g., the effects of unique events such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on emotions 
and social behavior). Other indicators such as statistical power, precision of estimate, reliability, 
and internal, construct, and external validity are also important and deserve at least as much 
                                                          
1
 These recommendations included specific suggestions for actions by the publications, training, and awards 
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attention (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Thus, the task force recommendations consider all 
of these criteria, as well as seeking to make research practices more transparent and to 
improve researchers’ education and training.  To set the stage for these recommendations, we 
review a few basic but essential statistical concepts. 
 
A Brief Statistical Primer 
Social and personality psychologists work hard to design informative research. Yet, the 
researcher has no control over many aspects of a study, including the participant’s genetics, 
early environment, and even what happened to the participant on the way to the laboratory. 
Hence, findings of a study based on one sample of 100 participants cannot be expected to be 
exactly the same as those based on another sample of 100 participants drawn from the same 
population. This state of affairs gives rise to the need for statistics to allow researchers to 
address variation, often substantial in magnitude, that occurs from sample to sample (sampling 
error) and to make an inference about what would happen if they could measure the entire 
population. The statistical concepts that underlie such inference have important implications 
for how research should be conducted, analyzed and reported.  
Type 1 Error: The Type 1 error rate (α) is the conditional probability that the present data, or 
even more extreme data, will be observed in a given sample given a specific condition in the 
population.  As typically used in social and personality psychology, that condition is that the 
relationship (treatment effect; correlation) in the population is precisely 0.  A relationship of 0 
in the population means that any non-zero results observed in a specific sample are purely due 
to chance.  Following a suggestion by Sir Ronald Fisher, a convention that the Type 1 error rate 
should not exceed .05 has been widely accepted.  The goal of this convention is to set an 
acceptable upper limit on the likelihood that findings will be reported as "significant" when 
there actually is no relationship in the population from which the current sample was drawn.   
This technique of "null hypothesis significance testing" (NHST) continues to be widely used 

















anuscript          




2007).  As Jacob Cohen (1994, p. 997) noted, "What we want to know is 'Given these data, what 
is the probability that H0 [the null hypothesis] is true?’ But as most of us know, what the 
obtained p-value tells us is ‘Given that H0 is true, what is the probability of these (or more 
extreme) data?’”  Another common criticism is that, because the obtained p-value varies with N 
(the number of participants or independent observations included in a particular study), it is 
not a measure of the magnitude of the finding -- although it is often erroneously interpreted as 
such. 
Effect Size: The magnitude of the statistical relationship found, the "effect size," may be 
expressed in unstandardized (raw) units or in standardized (z-score) units. For an experiment on 
the effects of priming on response time, the mean unstandardized difference in response time 
(Y) between primed and unprimed treatment conditions might be                  = 5.0 
milliseconds. For a correlational study on the relationship between fathers' and sons' heights, 
the unstandardized regression coefficient (slope) for predicting the height of an adult son from 
his father’s height might be B1 = 0.5 inches (i.e., for each 1 inch increase in the height of the 
father, the son will be on average 0.5 inches taller).  In areas with clear consensus that the 
measurement units are at least interval level (e.g., seconds, mm blood pressure), 
unstandardized effect sizes are preferred.  However, in many areas of social and personality 
psychology, such well-developed measurement units are not available (e.g., 5-point Likert type 
ratings; different scales used across studies).  In these cases, standardized effect sizes are 
advisable. For experiments comparing treatment (t) and control (c) conditions, a commonly 
used standardized effect size is Cohen’s d = 
     
  
 , which divides the difference between the 
means of the treatment  and control groups by an estimate of the standard deviation of the 
difference (SD).  For correlational relations, standardized effect sizes include the Pearson 
correlation r and the squared partial correlation (pr2). We focus below on the most commonly 
used effect size statistics, d and r, which are estimates of their corresponding parameter values 
in the population, δ and ρ. 
Perhaps because d is traditionally used in experimental research and r is more often used in 
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mathematical relationship.  The Pearson r can be converted to Cohen's d via the formula 
  
  
√      
, and the reverse conversion is    
   
√    
 (Rosenthal, 1991). 
Statistical Power: When the null hypothesis of no relationship is rejected, the conventions of 
NHST lead to the conclusion that an alternative directional hypothesis (e.g., the response time 
in the prime condition is less than in the control condition) can be accepted.   
Statistical power is the conditional probability that a true effect of a precisely specified size 
(e.g., δ  = 0.5 or ρ  = 0.3) in the population will be detected in a study using such conventional 
significance testing. Statistical power is 1 – the Type 2 error rate, where the Type 2 error rate is 
the conditional probability that a true effect of the precisely specified size will not be detected 
under NHST. Recall that statistical power and the Type 1 error rate are conditional probabilities; 
each only applies when the relevant condition is met. Type 1 error applies when the effect is 0 
in the population; statistical power applies when the precisely specified (e.g., δ  = 0.5 or ρ  = 
0.3) effect size characterizes the population.  
An important goal in designing research is to maximize statistical power, the probability that 
the null hypothesis will be rejected if there is, in fact, a true effect of the specified size in the 
population.  However, this goal can be challenging -- statistical power will be limited by factors 
such as sample size, measurement error, and the homogeneity of the participants. Cohen 
(1988) suggested a convention that investigations should normally have power = 0.8 to detect a 
true effect of the specified size in the population.  This value assumes a Type 2 error rate (.20) 
that is four times the conventional Type 1 error rate (.05).  Other, typically higher, values of 
power (e.g., 0.9) have been suggested in other disciplines (e.g., Lenth, 2001) and for certain 
types of investigations (e.g., important replication studies; tests of important applied 
programs).   
Relations amongType 1 Error, Standardized Effect Size, Statistical Power, and Sample Size: 
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related (Rosenthal, 1991).  If any two are known, the third can be directly computed.2  This 
basic point is not universally understood.  For example, claims that researchers only need to 
care about the p-level of an effect but not its size evaporate in the light of the recognition that 
to report or to base a decision on one of these numbers is precisely equivalent to reporting or 
basing a decision on the other, given a particular N.3  For illustration, imagine that a researcher 
finds the result that p = .05 (two tailed) in a study with N = 80. The estimate of the standardized 
effect size will then be r = .22. Given this relationship, the conventional practice of setting α = 
.05 (two tailed) as the critical threshold for significance in this study is precisely equivalent to 
employing the standard that the result should not be reported if the effect size estimate is 
lower than r = .22.   
Despite this equivalence, focusing solely on the observed p-level is problematic because 
findings with equivalent p-levels can have very different implications.  In cases where Ns are 
very large (e.g., when working with census data), extremely small effect sizes may achieve 
statistical significance, yet carry no important theoretical or practical meaning.  In other cases, 
where Ns are very small (e.g., in experiments with only a handful of subjects per condition), 
significant effects may imply implausibly large effect sizes.  An implausibly large effect size, 
especially when paired with a small N, may be an irreproducible outlier (“fluke” finding) or 
even, in rare cases, a leading indicator of improper research practices. 
The problems with focusing exclusively on the observed p-level are exacerbated when 
researchers over-rely on the dichotomous distinction between “significant” and “non-
significant” results.  This common practice risks treating nearly equivalent findings as if they 
were importantly different, especially if one finding barely attains the p < .05 threshold whereas 
                                                          
2
 For example, in meta-analytic practice, a standard method for estimating effect sizes is to convert the reported 
exact p-level to t, and then employ the formula,    √
  
   (        )
  , where n1 and n2 are the sizes of the two 
samples (or experimental groups) being compared (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  This conversion, and others, can also 
be performed using online calculators such as 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/resources/effect_size_input.php.   
3
 Cumming (2012) notes the extreme variability in exact p-values that can result even in identical replications of 
the same experiment simply due to natural variation from sample to sample, a fact little appreciated by many 
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the other barely misses it.  We have seen cases in which researchers reported a significant and 
theoretically expected effect, then reassured readers by showing that a further effect that 
would disconfirm their theory (or reveal a confound) did not achieve significance.  Yet the 
confidence intervals of the two effect sizes showed substantial overlap!4  If the difference 
between two effects is theoretically important, then they should be tested for whether they are 
significantly different from each other, not just from zero.  More generally, the routine 
reporting of effect sizes and confidence intervals would help prevent researchers from drawing 
misleading interpretations of this sort.  
The relationship among p-value, effect size, and sample size extends directly to statistical 
power.  Once any three of the four statistical quantities are known, the fourth can be easily 
calculated with freely downloadable, user friendly software like G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007) and MBESS (Kelley, 2007).  Two common analysis scenarios involve these 
quantities.  These analyses should be carried out before5 the investigation is conducted because 
they provide important information regarding whether the planned study has sufficient 
statistical power to be able to detect the hypothesized effects of interest. 
In the first scenario, an α (typically .05), a value of statistical power (typically 0.8), and a range 
of reasonable estimates of the standardized effect sizes in the population are considered in 
order to determine what sample size is needed.  Estimates of standardized effect sizes may be 
gleaned from (in order of preference) meta-analyses, prior research, pilot studies, or norms 
established by Cohen (1988) or by investigators in the substantive area of research for small, 
moderate, and large effect sizes. Many researchers in social psychology are unaware of the 
                                                          
4
 In other words, although the first effect is “significant” and the second is not, the two effects are not necessarily 
significantly different from each other. 
5
 Statisticians strongly advocate a priori power calculations. Less known is that observed (post hoc) power analyses 
sometimes suggested by behavioral science researchers are not recommended by statisticians (e.g., Hoenig & 
Heisey, 2001; Lenth, 2001). Observed power calculations typically do not provide the desired information and can 
lead to nonsensical conclusions in some applications.  Confidence intervals or equivalence tests described later in 
this article are more likely to provide the desired information.  Yuan and Maxwell (2005) show analytically and 
through simulation that the results of post hoc power analyses are biased and often associated with large errors of 
estimation.  They conclude that when the estimate of observed power is low, “the observed power may not 
provide any useful information regardless of the sample size!” (p. 163).  Observed power analyses ignore the 
confidence interval associated with the observed effect size and the nonlinear relationship between effect size and 
statistical power.  As noted by Lenth (2007), “Researchers owe it to themselves to take a thoroughly prospective 
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sample sizes required to achieve adequate statistical power. For example, if an experiment on 
priming were to assign an equal number of participants to the priming and control conditions 
(nprime = ncontrol), a total of 788 participants (394 in each condition) would be needed to detect a 
small standardized effect size (δ = 0.2 standard deviation difference), 128 participants would be 
needed to detect a moderate standardized effect size (δ = 0.5), and 52 participants would be 
needed to detect a large effect size (δ = 0.8) with power = 0.8.  These values indicate that 
experiments with 10 or 20 participants per condition – which are not uncommon – are seriously 
underpowered except in the case of large effect sizes that are rare in personality and social 
psychology. Statistical studies of the published literature in clinical, personality, and social 
psychology journals have found that the typical investigation in these fields has a statistical 
power of approximately .45 to .65 to detect a moderate effect size in the population (δ = 0.50 
or ρ = .30); some other areas (e.g., health psychology) typically exceed power = .80 (see Rossi, 
2013).  
In the second scenario, an α, a feasible sample size (e.g., 100 participants), and reasonable 
estimate(s) of the standardized effect size are chosen in order to calculate power.  If an 
experiment includes 100 total participants, 50 in each treatment group, the estimated 
statistical power will be 0.17 to detect a small, .70 to detect a moderate, and .98 to detect a 
large effect size.  Methods also exist for increasing statistical power without increasing N (see 
Dennis, Lennox, & Foss, 1997; Shadish et al., 2002, Table 2.3); these methods involve 
procedures (e.g., more powerful treatments, more reliable measurement, more homogeneous 
participants, more adequate treatment of missing data) that increase the standardized effect 
size.  
A meta-analysis of a wide range of social psychological phenomena found an overall average 
published effect size of r = .21 (or d = .46) (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003).  A smaller 
meta-analysis of personality research found exactly the same average published effect size, r = 
.21 (Fraley & Marks, 2007).   While perhaps an overestimate because of publication bias, this 
effect size provides one plausible candidate for benchmarking the effect size estimate that 
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Recommendations for Research Practice 
The task force recommends several "best practices" for research in personality and social 
psychology, most of which are based on the statistical concepts and their relationships 
summarized above.  While not intended as hard-and-fast rules (see Recommendation 7, below), 
we believe that these recommendations are sufficiently important that researchers should take 
them into account when planning, analyzing and reporting their research in SPSP journals or 
elsewhere. 
Recommendation 1. Describe and address choice of N and consequent issues of statistical 
power. 
Researchers should design studies with sufficient power to detect the key effects of interest. 
Often, research will involve multiple types of effects (e.g., effects of treatments on the key 
outcome; mediational analyses) that can be expected to have different effect sizes.  The sample 
size should normally be justified based on the smallest effect of interest. For example, consider 
a 2 x 2 design in which a hypothesized main (average) effect of treatment is expected to be 
large in magnitude (δ = 0.8) and a theoretically equally important treatment x gender 
interaction is expected to be moderate in magnitude (δ = 0.5).  The researcher should base the 
power calculation on the magnitude of the smaller treatment x gender interaction effect. This 
difference can be consequential: The n needed to achieve .80 power increases from 
approximately 52 total participants for the d = 0.8 main effect to approximately 128 total 
participants for the d = 0.5 interaction effect, assuming participants have been equally divided 
among the four groups.  
We recognize that research involving small populations (e.g., rare diseases), time-intensive 
methods (e.g., coding naturalistic behavior), longitudinal data gathered over extended periods 
of time, or larger units of analysis (e.g., group dynamics research) may not be able to achieve 
high levels of statistical power.  For some newer statistical procedures, no known mathematical 
solution for calculating statistical power may yet exist. (In these cases, several statistical 
packages [e.g., Mplus, see Muthén & Muthén, 2002 for an introduction] now include relatively 
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power.) It is important to underline that studies that do not achieve high statistical power 
should not be dismissed out of hand; they can still gather data that are informative and worthy 
of publication.  Nonetheless, we recommend that a priori statistical power be reported 
whenever possible and considered as one factor among many when interpreting results.  One 
potential salutary effect of conducting more studies with adequate power will be that more 
statistical effects of interest will achieve conventional (.05) levels of statistical significance. 
Consequently, any temptation to engage in questionable data analytic practices in order to 
achieve these conventional levels of significance is likely to be lower.  
Recommendation 2. Report effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for reported findings.  
Even though they are related, observed p-values, effect sizes, and confidence intervals highlight 
different aspects of the results, so they provide complementary information. p-values need to 
be supplemented by effect sizes that provide information on the magnitude of a finding. Effect 
sizes provide a clear metric for the comparison of results across studies (is the present result 
large/small relative to prior research?), and form the basis for meta-analyses summarizing 
entire bodies of research. As noted earlier, if there is good agreement on the units of the effect 
(e.g., reaction time in milliseconds; weight in kilograms), unstandardized effect sizes are 
preferred.  When no such agreement exists, standardized effect sizes should be reported. The 
task force recommends that either unstandardized or standardized effect sizes be reported, as 
appropriate. Occasionally this will not be possible because methods for calculating effect sizes 
for newly proposed advanced statistical procedures do not yet exist. 
Confidence intervals add an assessment of the precision of the estimate to the effect size 
measure. For the typical two-group between-subjects experiment in which different 
participants receive the treatment and control conditions, the confidence interval (CI) 
represents the difference between the group means ± a margin of error associated with 
sampling variability. The CI = (     )           (       )  where tcritical is the (tabled) value of 
the t-distribution corresponding to the level of Type 1 error rate selected (typically α = .05) and 
the degrees of freedom (df = nt + nc -2), where         is the standard error of the difference 
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of no relationship in the population is plausible, and therefore the null hypothesis, H0:  
       , cannot be rejected.  A 95% confidence interval means that the true effect will be 
included in the confidence interval 95% of the time across repeated investigations using 
samples of the same size from the same population.  As was mentioned earlier, when effects 
within a study are theoretically expected to be different from each other, examination of the 
CIs illustrates whether this expectation was met (Cumming & Finch, 2005).  By the same token, 
examination of the overlap between the confidence intervals of multiple replication studies 
provides far more information about the conclusions that should be drawn than simple 
examination of the obtained p-values or whether the results of each study were statistically 
significant or not (Cumming, 2012). 
For the earlier priming experiment example, a 95% confidence interval of 4.5 to 5.5 
milliseconds implies a far more precise estimate of the difference in the mean reaction time 
between the primed and control conditions than a 95% confidence interval of 0.01 to 9.99 
milliseconds. The latter finding reflects substantial imprecision in the results and should 
therefore stimulate appropriate caution in drawing theoretical inferences. Moreover, while 
confidence intervals that do not include zero offer conventional grounds for rejecting the null 
hypothesis, such intervals may still include ranges of non-zero effect sizes that are too small to 
be theoretically informative.   
Evaluation of effect size is a matter for scientific interpretation because small effects sizes can 
be potentially be important. Moreover, standardized effect sizes can be affected by the 
strength of the experimental manipulation, the precision of measurement, the homogeneity of 
the sample, whether the research was conducted in the laboratory or in the field, and many 
other factors.  The definition and interpretation of the scientific importance of small and large 
effect sizes, therefore, depends on the nature of the research question, the research context, 
and the substantive domain.  
Confidence intervals can be easily constructed for most types of effects, but sometimes 
complications arise. Some confidence intervals (e.g., for the Pearson r) are not symmetric and 
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a known mathematical solution and can only be constructed empirically through repeated 
sampling procedures (e.g., bootstrapping). Researchers can compute a priori estimates of the 
sample size needed to produce a confidence interval with a desired width with user-friendly 
software (see Kelley, 2007; Kelley & Maxwell, 2012).  Increasing sample size and improving the 
reliability of dependent measures can both help achieve tighter confidence intervals.  The task 
force recommends that a conventional 95% confidence interval be reported to provide an 
estimate of both the size and the precision of the effect.  
Recommendation 3: Avoid “questionable research practices.”   
Recommendations 1 and 2 assume that the researcher has proposed hypotheses prior to 
conducting a study, has tested hypotheses "appropriately," and has reported findings "fully." 
Differences of opinion can certainly exist about what constitute "appropriate" analytic 
strategies and "full" reporting of results in a particular study. Nonetheless, procedures that look 
at the results and then tweak the data post hoc to achieve statistical significance undermine the 
ability of researchers to reach a valid conclusion about the existence of an effect in the 
population. In a review of articles published in three journals, Masicampo and Lalande (2012) 
found that p-values between .045 and .050  were reported far more often than would be 
expected statistically. When data have been tweaked, the reported effect size will almost 
certainly be far greater in magnitude than the true effect size—which might well be 0. Such 
practices greatly increase the likelihood that even a well-designed replication study will fail to 
support the original finding.  
Therefore, the following research practices are widely regarded as questionable: (1) conducting 
multiple tests of significance on a data set without statistical correction; (2) running participants 
until significant results are obtained (i.e., data-peeking to determine the stopping point for data 
collection); (3) dropping observations, measures, items, experimental conditions, or 
participants after looking at the effects on the outcomes of interest; and (4) running multiple 
experiments with similar procedures and only reporting those yielding significant results. These 
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lead to serious inflation of the Type 1 error rate and yet not be recognized in the review process 
(Simmons et al., 2011).   
We fully acknowledge that in the context of exploratory research and certain other cases some 
of these practices may be justifiable and even wise.  When problems of interpretation arise, it is 
often because of how studies and analyses were reported, not how they were conducted.  
Therefore, if researchers feel that these research practices are warranted for a given study, 
great care should be taken to fully describe the research and analytic process. The findings 
should be clearly described as exploratory to avoid representing tentative discoveries as 
conclusive findings until they are replicated or otherwise verified (Diaconis, 1985). 
Recommendation 4. Include in an appendix the verbatim wording (translated if necessary) of all 
independent and dependent variable instructions, manipulations and measures. If the 
manuscript is published, this appendix can be made available as an on-line supplement to the 
article. 
Researchers wishing to replicate an existing study or to conduct a new study that builds on 
earlier research need to know the precise procedures of the prior research.  Historically, space 
limitations have precluded complete reporting of the details of studies, necessitating extensive 
correspondence with the author to fully ascertain key procedures. This limitation is no longer 
relevant given web-based storage. The increased transparency provided by the availability of 
the full description of the study will provide readers with a greater ability to evaluate the 
results of the study and to conduct related research.  
Recommendation 5. Adhere to SPSP’s “Data Sharing Policy” which states that: “The 
corresponding author of every empirically-based publication is responsible for providing the raw 
data and related coding information underlying all findings reported in the paper to other 
competent professionals who seek to verify the substantive claims through reanalysis and who 
intend to use such data only for that purpose, provided that a) the confidentiality of the 
participants can be protected; b) legal rights concerning proprietary data do not preclude their 
release; and c) those requesting data agree in writing in advance that shared data are to be 
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other agreed-upon use. " Adopted by the Executive Committee of the Society for Personality 
and Social Psychology, July 19, 2013.   
Open access to data is the norm in most scientific disciplines once results based on those data 
have been published. Many of the US funding agencies also require sharing of publicly funded 
data after investigators have published their findings. At the same time, participant 
confidentiality (e.g., the possibility that any participant could be uniquely identified from 
information in the data base) and legal agreements concerning proprietary data (e.g., data 
made available by an organization to a researcher) must be honored. Unlike some areas of 
science, psychology has not yet developed a norm of verifying important findings through 
reanalyses of data. This norm may be reflected in the relative paucity of erratum reports in our 
journals.  Reanalyses not only can identify errors made by the original authors, but can reveal 
heretofore unconsidered features of the data that clarify the theoretical contribution of the 
study.  We encourage researchers to document and archive the dataset on which their reported 
analyses are based at the time they submit the original research report. This practice facilitates 
easy access of the data if they are requested at some future point in time. 
Recommendation 6.  Encourage, and improve the availability of publication outlets for 
replication studies. 
Many researchers would agree that replicability is the sine qua non of scientific knowledge.  
There is much to value in the "scientist's belief in 'stubborn facts' with a life span that is greater 
than the fluctuating theories with which one tries to explain them" (Shadish, et al., 2002, p. 31). 
Yet replication studies traditionally have been difficult to fund and to publish.  Funding agencies 
prioritize new and “transformative” research topics, and many journals implicitly – and 
sometimes explicitly – discourage the publication of replication studies.  However, establishing 
a firm foundation upon which findings can accumulate will be useful in ultimately pushing 
research forward, by helping researchers to avoid premature closure and blind alleys.  Some 
settled research questions may not be as settled as commonly believed.  Further, a great deal 
of wasted research time and resources might be avoided if researchers could be more 
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Therefore, we suggest that funding agencies reserve some proportion of their resources for 
high quality replication studies, either as independent projects (if warranted by the importance 
of the research question) or as part of research programs exploring new topics.  We also believe 
that the journal that originally published a prominent finding has a special obligation to publish 
high quality research that replicates or fails to replicate that finding, rather than automatically  
consigning such research to lower-visibility or limited “replication” journals.  At the same time, 
replication studies should be evaluated against the high standard of quality enforced for the 
journal as a whole.  In the case of replication research, hallmarks of high quality include 
adequate power (and the more the better, perhaps suggesting a benchmark of .90 or .95 for 
adequate power for single replication studies rather than the conventional .80), multiple 
studies, sound methodology, and high theoretical importance. These are all matters for 
editorial judgment.  We would further suggest that the research community allocate higher 
value to replication research than it has traditionally received in the past. We particularly 
encourage research that integrates replication studies into progressive, creative research 
programs that have the potential to contribute to both the underlying foundation of "stubborn 
facts" as well as to make innovative contributions to knowledge. 
Recommendation 7.  Maintain flexibility and openness to alternative standards and methods 
when evaluating research. 
Notwithstanding everything said above, we do not advocate inflexible rules. One of the 
hallmarks of the scientific peer-review process is that each paper is evaluated individually, in 
the context of its specific subfield, and according to ever-improving data analytic techniques. 
Standards of evaluation should shift across studies and over time, and editors and reviewers 
should be flexible. Some research requires special populations, methods, or data analyses, 
making it impossible to apply the same standards across the board. Any reform movement risks 
going too far – imposing new standards so strictly that the diversity of research questions and 
methods is stifled.  One of the strengths of social/personality psychology, perhaps what puts 
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diversity. We should balance consistently rigorous standards with attention to the unique 
challenges of different research questions and methodologies. 
 
Recommendations for Educational Practice 
The recommended research practices would, we believe, increase the quality of published 
research. However, there is the chance that those who adopt these practices before they 
become commonplace may be at a disadvantage in the publication and hiring/promotion 
process.  Thus, in order to make our field more amenable to these practices, it is important for 
all of us, including editors, reviewers, and those who make hiring/promotion decisions, to 
educate ourselves about their value.  
Recommendation 1: Encourage a culture of “getting it right” rather than “finding significant 
results.” 
The beginning of this educational process is to encourage a culture of “getting it right” 
(accurate knowledge) over “successful” studies (valuing only predicted statistically significant 
effects) (Asendorpf et al., 2013).  Venues for encouraging this culture include those with an 
explicit educational purpose, such as graduate and undergraduate courses, textbooks, 
workshops, and methodological articles, as well as those where the educational purpose is 
more implicit, such as editorial guidelines and instructions to reviewers and grant panels.  All of 
these venues provide opportunities for teaching or reminding both experienced and novice 
researchers that the contribution of a particular piece of research should be evaluated in terms 
of whether the research is carefully designed to address important and interesting questions, 
whether care has gone into operationalization and measurement, and whether the 
characteristics of the particular sample (both its nature and size) are appropriate to the 
questions being asked and the generalizability of the conclusions that are drawn. In addition, it 
is critical that the statistical analyses used are appropriate for the questions and the nature of 
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not (all) the results come out as expected, or analyses clearly identified as exploratory address 
questions that arose only after unexpected initial results.  
Recommendation 2: Teach and encourage transparency of data reporting, including 
"imperfect" results. 
Researchers sometimes feel under pressure to conduct studies that can be completed quickly, 
to adjust their hypotheses to fit their results, and/or to provide incomplete information about 
their methodology or findings if things “did not work”. The recommendations put forward here 
encourage, instead, a focus on the informativeness of data despite occasional messiness. 
Although omitting non-significant or unexpected findings can help the flow of a paper, it is 
important to keep that information available somewhere, if not in the paper then in 
supplemental materials available to readers. In our various roles-- as mentors of students, as 
authors, editors, reviewers, and grant panel members—we need to promote a climate that 
emphasizes "telling the whole story" rather than "telling a good story." 
Recommendation 3: Improve methodological instruction on topics such as effect size, 
confidence intervals, statistical power, meta-analysis, replication, and the effects of 
questionable research practices. 
We encourage graduate and undergraduate courses in statistics, research methods and ethics, 
as well as workshops and tutorials open to those at all stages of their careers, to include 
training about the issues raised in these recommendations. These include the consequences of 
using questionable research practices and the usefulness of effect sizes, confidence intervals, 
and statistical power.  Students should also learn about the importance of meta-analytic 
thinking, why replication is important, and the unique challenges of replication research.  
Recommendation 4:  Model sound science and support junior researchers who seek to “get it 
right.” 
The burden for improving the field should not fall mainly on new researchers.  Perhaps the best 
way to effect change is to model improved research practice and alter the incentive structures 
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proper research practices by conducting and publishing sound science, correctly analyzed and 
transparently reported, which may entail following practices different from those commonly 
used in the past.  Second, and perhaps even more importantly, they can encourage and support 
the publication, hiring, and promotion of junior researchers who put "getting it right" ahead of 
"publishing significant findings."  Sometimes, a shorter vita may be a better one. 
 
Some Reflections on the Implications of Statistical Power for Replication Studies 
The late meta-analyst John Hunter wryly offered his observations on the progress of research in 
many areas of psychology given that researchers often ignore considerations of effect size and 
statistical power.  According to Hunter, a research area begins with the proposal of an 
interesting hypothesis and the excitement of a first demonstration study that finds a large 
effect size.  Subsequent research tries to clarify the phenomenon by designing studies to rule 
out alternative explanations, thereby making the effect size smaller.  This stage is followed by a 
generation of studies investigating mediation and moderation, which further reduce the effect 
size.  Researchers continue to use informal guidelines for sample size gleaned from the 
experience of the initial demonstration study. The result is that replication of the original effect 
becomes less and less common due to decreased statistical power.  Finally comes the inevitable 
review paper:  “Where is the (insert name) effect?”  Different stages of research will be 
associated with different effect sizes.  Careful attention to effect size, sample size, and 
statistical power is thus needed as research progresses. 
Moreover, reviewers and editors must expect a less than perfect match of results across 
multiple studies, multiple measures, and multiple analyses.  If four independent exact 
replications of a study are properly conducted with a statistical power of 0.8 to detect the true 
effect size in the population, the probability that all of the replications will be statistically 
significant is only 0.4! If the power is lower than .80 -- as is common in personality and social 
psychology-- the probability of an unbroken series of significant replications is even lower, 
perhaps to the point of implausibility (Schimmack, 2012).  Rather than expecting uniformly 
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to the obtained pattern of effect sizes across measures and studies, as advocated by Donald 
Campbell, can help reduce this problem. Meta-analyses of the results across multiple studies 
can provide even better estimates of the mean and variability of the effect sizes. 
The methodological issues in conducting a replication study can be challenging, with statistical 
power deserving special consideration. Often the original effect size can be estimated from only 
a single study (or a few studies).  Maxwell (2013) and Dallow and Fina (2011) remind us that the 
true population effect size is not known; rather the effect size is estimated so that it has a 
confidence interval. In addition, the relation between effect size and power is not linear, so the 
effects on statistical power when the effect size estimate is too low are not mitigated by cases 
in which the effect size estimate is too high.  Finally, we must be very cautious in concluding 
that a study did not replicate and therefore there is no effect. This conclusion implies the 
questionable practice of accepting the null hypothesis that the effect size is precisely 0.   
Maxwell’s analysis implies that researchers seeking to replicate the results of a study may want 
(a) to consider using a lower than reported effect size to calculate power when it is estimated 
based on a single study, (b) to develop a minimum value for an effect size that is deemed too 
small to be of interest, so that a test of nonequivalence (Rogers, Howard, & Vessey, 1982; 
Seeman & Serlin, 1998) can be performed testing more definitively whether the obtained effect 
is less or greater than that value, and (c) to use a higher value than .80 for statistical power to 
enhance the probability that the replication clarifies rather than further confuses the finding.  
Each of these steps enhances the credibility and usefulness of the replication study. Alternative 
Bayesian statistical approaches such as calculating the Bayes factor (Kass & Raftery, 1995) can 
also be informative about the relative likelihood that each competing hypothesis is true.  
 
Conclusion 
Donald Campbell (see Overman, 1988) long espoused his belief in the capacity of mutual 
criticism to improve scientific practice and ultimately promote understanding of the "truth" of 
scientific claims. The development of a field of personality and social psychology that values 
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important that responses to replication studies should be civil and focus solely on issues of 
research methodology and substantive theory.  Failures by others to replicate one’s work 
should be treated as opportunities to work together with colleagues to find the parameters 
under which a theoretically expected effect is and is not found.  Critiques of research 
methodology or empirical findings merit constructive, not defensive, responses. By the same 
token, critiques and replication studies should be undertaken as open-minded investigations of 
the generalizability of important, interesting effects, not as cynical attempts to "score points" 
or undermine established findings.  As psychologists we know that such guidelines can be 
challenging to follow.  But, to the extent we can focus on critical scientific issues and foster a 
culture of "getting it right," our field will enjoy more rapid scientific progress as well as better 
collegial relations.  
Finally, while some of the recommendations offered in this article address particular aspects of 
psychological research, most of them – especially those regarding the promotion and 
acceptance of replication studies – address issues that are common to many areas of research 
in the physical, life and behavioral sciences (e.g., Rehman, 2013).  Our hope is that these 
recommendations can help lead the way to improved research practices and a more 
transparent research culture, throughout all of science. 
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